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failures and their sins would fall upon him. He was emotionally and socially dependent upon the members of his family, yet he had to be stern and distant to maintain his authority.

At the same time, the family members were expected to completely identify themselves with the family as a whole. This submerging of the individual in the family collective was manifested, for instance, in the ideas of common family good, rooted in the Old-Slavonic principles of mutual reponsibility and mutual aid of all community members ("all for one, one for all"). The elder brothers were expected to take care of their minor brothers and of their unmarried sisters; the aged or disabled parents were in the care of their children; the father was expected to maintain his daughter-in-law if she lost her husband or if her husband were away.[1]

Earlier, following Mongol traditions, the family was collectively responsible for the misdeeds or crimes of any one of its members.[2] In early Russia, according to the Expanded Version of the *Pravda*, "if anyone attacks and kills another without the slightest provocation, the inhabitants of the district do not make payment for this kind of a murderer, but they shall surrender him, with his wife and children, for sentencing to banishment or imprisonment, and his home shall be given up for plundering."[3] Also later in Muscovite Russia all members of a family were considered involved in the offense of a member.

This complete identification with one's family and this penal philosophy of collective responsibility, of implied collective culpability and family hostages (retained in Russian police practices until nowadays) favored family self-centeredness and self-concern. There was therefore a tendency to draw a curtain of secrecy around the family in order not to expose it to accusations and to protect it from defamation. In the urban strata the master of the household was very much preoccupied with this problem. "Your neighbors will reproach you, and your enemies will rejoice at your misfortune," warns Domostroy. Such family centeredness, which was a result of the ascendency of an autocratic state, favored social isolation and lack of intimate contact with neighbors; hence, it fostered also lack of social trust.

Family centrism, family isolation, and lack of trust in one's

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brotherhood could still be maintained. Since the seventeenth century, however, expenditures for military campaigns and for growing ranks of salaried bureaucrats necessitated increasing state incomes which could be obtained without much delay. Since the state was industrially and commercially undeveloped, the only way to increase revenues was in finding new means to squeeze out of the peasantry a still larger part of its produce. Therefore the old system of direct tax collecting from the mir was found to function inefficiently on the estates of the nobility, and laws were passed which made the landowners responsible for the collection of state taxes from the peasantry. In this way ties between the manorial peasants and the central government were severed.[1]

As a result of such a change in the political structure, the manorial serfs became now entirely dependent upon the owners of the manorial estates. There was no more possibility for the peasants to appeal directly to the government. Between the government and the manorial peasants stood now the landlords to whom the peasants became exclusively responsible as a final authority in all matters, administrative as well as judiciary.[2] *Pomeshchik* was now looked upon as the "natural protector of people, their local judge, the guardian of their welfare, their tutor, the trustee of poor and orphans, observer of good order and law."[3] He was considered as the Czar's overseer and watchdog.[4] The patriarchal dominance-submission and protection-dependence relationships which existed between the Czar and his subjects were now extended to the landlord and his serfs. Both the Czar and the landlord were addressed as *batyushka* (father).

The position of the serf, however, was now so much more precarious because in new relationships the power of the landlord was absolute. A life-long banishment to Siberia awaited him who lodged a complaint against his master. And since there were neither written laws nor any established customary law to regulate the relations between the serfs and the manorial lords, the serfs were completely dependent upon the degree of moral or ethical standards of their masters for their lives and well-being. These were often very low. Hence unprotected either by

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written or by customary rules of conduct and often exposed to the arbitrariness and mistreatment of their lords, the serfs on many manorial estates came to be completely dependent upon the will and capriciousness of their masters.

It is obvious that many landed gentry who were given such absolute rights over their serfs would tend to completely subjugate the mir also. In such circumstances the mir was likely to lose its character of a self-ruled and self-contained community and instead tended to become an instrument of landlord's power which made the landowner the absolute monarch of his estate. Under the overlordship of the estate owner the mir kept its watchful eye over every peasant, and made it easier for the landowner to manage his property, and for the government to rule the country. It was under such external pressures that the steppe traditions of an absolute, stern and distant patriarchal power were being strengthened among the peasantry.

II

The conditions of the peasants did not improve in these respects after the abolishment of serfdom in the second part of the nineteenth century.[5] The peasants were emancipated from the rule of the pomeshchiks and subjected again directly to the government. But now the government, pushed by pressing demands for increasing revenues, made the mir an instrument of state control and found in it one of the most exacting of tax collectors. In order to be assured of payment the state had to concede to the mir all of the most severe measures of authority. Now the mir was entitled to banish unsolvent peasants to Siberia. And when corporal punishment was abolished in urban criminal law practice, it was still left in use in the mir.[6]

After the abolishment of serfdom the mir came under the supervision of the district chief of police (*Ispravnik*). The law of 1874 gave the police the right to arrest and to fine the village elders, and even to demand from the governor of the province their discharge. The position of the elder became so undesirable that the mir sometimes had to exert force to obtain candidates for this office or to prevent those in office from resigning.[7]

There was another official in this system of rural administra-

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level violence was manifested in frequent beatings of wife and children, and on the rural community level in habitual drunkenness that often ended in brawls and even murder.[18] In conditions which foster human degradation and lack of trust, both self-seeking and vindictiveness flourish. Hence the Great-Russian peasant was inclined to commit atrocious acts of revenge against people whom he considered as his persecutors or who caused him any harm. When threatening with revenge the Great-Russian peasant was likely to say: "You will pay me with your own blood" (*Ty u menya kroviyu svoey umoeshsya*). Killing as a revenge, burning hay-ricks, barns and homes was a common occurrence. The peasants were likely to organize a collective hunt against real or fancied malefactors and mutilate them or put them to death by means of torture:

> For murder and robbery, death of the culprit—sometimes with mutilation by cutting and tearing off of various parts of his body. For horse-theft and grand larceny they practice sometimes hammering of iron nails into the head and forcing of wooden pins under the nails and also merciless beating even onto death; . . . in some instances the case ends by maiming the thief and letting him go.[19]

At the same time the frontiersmen and professional warriors, such as the Cossacks, became renowned and widely admired because of their deeds of vindictiveness and violence. War was a great opportunity for people with such inclinations. As Gogol has put it, the Cossacks found a great delight in "accumulating booty from raided towns, putting the villages and the fields on fire, and spreading their glories by far and wide throughout the steppe" in order "to revenge themselves for all evil and humiliation."[20] There were numerous robber and Cossack songs which told about such exploits, and expressed desire for vindictiveness and destructive aggression.

Destructive aggression was nursed on the patriarchal family level and reinforced by conditions in the local community. Thus as soon as the controls of the authorities would weaken, mass revolts would come into the open. Such a behavior in turn was used by the local authorities as a justification for their strictness in dealing with the peasants: